Seminar: ceClub: The Technion Computer Engineering Club
Time Is Money: Incentivized Causal Transaction Ordering
Front-running is a subtle and persistent problem for blockchains. A blockchain is a stateful virtual machine executing instructions called transactions. Users earn rewards by publishing functional transactions essential to the system. Attackers observe these transactions and publish their own ahead of the users’, seizing the reward and eroding users’ incentive to publish functional transactions. Preventing front-running means enforcing causality: If an attacker receives transaction (\textit{tx}_A) and then publishes transaction (\textit{tx}_B), then (\textit{tx}_A) must be ordered before (\textit{tx}_B). However, this causality is only observed by the attacker. Practical systems order transactions by bid amount, so transactions willing to pay more get executed first, but this only results in a bidding war eroding users’ rewards. Though numerous ordering approaches have been proposed, none achieves causality, leaving users vulnerable to front-running.
We present PRECEDE, a mechanism-design approach that achieves transaction causality in equilibrium by removing the economic incentive to front-run. PRECEDE orders transactions by a power-weighted randomized lottery, whose winning probability grows super-linearly in the bid. The user’s strategy of publishing a transaction with a deterring bid forms an equilibrium where the attacker refrains from competing. Moreover, PRECEDE deters the prominent sandwich attack, which relies on front-running. PRECEDE can be directly deployed in any censorship-resistant blockchain with a simple change to its transaction ordering mechanism.
Bio:
Hongyin Chen received his Ph.D. from Peking University advised by Prof. Xiaotie Deng. He is currently a postdoc in Ittay Eyal’s group at the Technion. His work centers on mechanism design and game theory in blockchain.

